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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
~JA)IES

LATSES AND
,T...£\.MES SDR.ALES,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

NICK FLOOR, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal From the Third District Court of Utah,
for Salt Lake County
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
This appeal involves a controversy between
the plaintiffs., the appellants, and Nick Floor, Inc.,
the defendant and respondent, as to the possession
of a certain storeroom - the first-floor ~and basement at 79 ·West Second South street, being1 the
northwest corner of what is known as the Eagle
building or block situate at the southeast corner of
Second South and West Temple streets, Salt Lake
City. With respect thereto, the plaintiffs claim
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title and possession of the premises through warranty deeds from the the:ru owners of the Eagle Block
executed May 31, 1939, including the premises in
question. . The defendant .claims possession of the
storeroom and basement by virtue of a ce~rtain lease
executed and delivered to it by the then owners, of
the Eagle Block on September 2fj, 193-3, .for a period
1of three years, with an option on conditions stated
in the lease for an additional period of five years,
or to and including September 25, 1941, the said
lease being exe·cuted and delivered by an admitted
agent of the then owners of the block.

PLAINTIFFS FAILED
ALLE,GED CAUSE.

TO

PROVE THEIR

By the complaint of the plaintiffs it was alleged, (Ab. 1), that on or about September 25, 1933,
the then owners of the Eagle block leased and demised the premises in question to the defendant
''from month to month at a monthly rental of $70.00
payable monthly in advance, and that on or about the
1st day of May, 1935, by mutual agreement,. the rental
was fixed at $90.00 per month; and tha.t by virtue
of such lease the defendant went into possesRion o-t
the said premises and still continues to hold and
occupy the same;" that on May 31, 1939, the premises by warranty deed _were conveyed to the plaintiffs by the owners of the Eagle Block, who then
became and ever sjnce have been the owners there'6f, and that on Ju~e 2, 1939, the plaintiffs in writing
demanded possession of the premises on or before
July 1, 1939, which the defendant refused to surrender; hence this _ action for restitution and
damages.
The defendant demurred generally and specially to the complaint, which \vas overruled, and
the:n answered, denyjng the lease and the terms a.nd
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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conditions thereof as alleged in the complaint, o-r
that anv
. lea~e \Yas n1ade from month to month 01
that defendant 'vent into possession of or occupied
the premises in Yirtue or in pursuance of any such
lease, as alleged in the complaint; and averred that
a \Yritten lease \Yas entered into September 25, 1933,
by the terms of \Vhich the p:remises in question were
derni8ed and leased to the defendant for a period of
three years at an agreed rental of $75.00 per month,
and \Yith the further stipulation stated in the leas-e
that for and in consideration of the defendant making permanent improvements in and upon the
premises to the amount of $1,000.00 on or before
Ivtay 1, 1935, the defendant \vas given possession of
the premises for an additional period of five years
from September 25, 1936, at a rental of $90.00 p-er
Inonth for and during such additional five years;
tl1at the defendant, prior to May 1, 1935, made such
permanent improvements to the value in excess of
$1,000.00, and since S-eptember 25, 1936, paid to the
owners of the building the rental of $90.00 a month
and aR in the lease stipulated; and that under and
in pursuance of such lease and not otherwise, the
defendant entered into and c.ontinued in possession
of the premises; a cop~y of the lease, (Ab. 11), was'
attached to the answer and made a part thereof.

.

To that the plaintiffs replied, (Ab. 15) that
the lease attached to the defendant's ans,ver was
void under Section 33-5-1 and 33-5-2, R. S. 1933,
because not executed by the- owners:) the predeces~ors of the plaintiffs, or by anyone in Wliting
•tu thorized so to do; and further alleged that the
defendant had not expended the sum of $1,000.00, or
nnv sum, in permanent improvements and had not
at ·anv time exercised the pretended option referred
to in. the lease. The defendant th~n further anAwered. ( . .L\.h. 16), pl~ading an estoppel, consisting
of about four pages of the printed a.bstra.ct, to which!
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reference is hereby ma.de, to which pleaded estoppel
the plaintiffs filed a general denial.

Upon these issues the case ·came on for trial before the court without a jury. The court made spe_
cific and complete findings on all of the issues in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs,
(Ab. 2.2-37). We refer to the findings in the main
as a complete answer to the appellant's brief wherein the findings are given but scant consideration.
True, assignments are made with respect to most
of them. But see (App,ellants' brief, 44) how feeble
consideration is given them as to insufficiency of
tvidence to support them, or as pointing out par..
ticulars \vherein it is~ claimed the evidence is insufficient.
The ap:pellants, however, say the court erred
in finding No. 1, "that on September 25, 1933, the
Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha, W. P.
Noble Company and the Bragg Estate by and
through their agent, A. H. Ball,'' leased and demised the premises in question to the defendant.
The lease attached to the defendant's answer was
so executed. It so states. Let the Court look at
it. (Ab. 11-14). There is no dispute as to that. It
'\vas the only lease put in evidence. It was the
·only ·lease under which the evidence showed the defendant took and continued in possession and was
in\ possession when notice- was served on it to
vacate the leased premises. As. to that, the plaintiffs replied, not that the lease was not executed by
1an agent, as in the findings stated, but that the lease
'vas void .- that it 'vas nothing, - because A. H.
Ball, the admitted agent of the grantors of the
plaintiffs, had no authority in writing to execute it.
~,he defendant denied that, and by its additional
ans'\\rer for reasons therein stated. pleaded an esSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

top·pel as to both the gr~tors of the plaintiffs and
a~ to the plaintiffs themselves, which estoppel by
their further reply 'Yas denied by the plaintiffs.

In this connection some stagger of complaint
i:; also made as to findings Nos. 2 and 3. Let them
be read in the abstract. No con1plaint is made that
the court by such findings did not properly reflect
the essentials of the plaintiffs' complaint, or of any
of the pleadings as hereinbefore noted, or that the
lease as alleged in the complaint was not personally
entered into by and between the predecessors of
the plaintiffs and the defendant, or that the court
incorrectly stated, that by the complaint of the
plaintiffs it was averred that the. defendant ''by
virtue of such lease (as alleged in the complaint)
went into possession of the said premises and still
continues to hold and occupy the same." As is seen,
the court specifically found that no evidence was
ndduced to show the existence or the making of anj
~uc h lease as so alleged in the plaintiffs' compl8int;
that the allegations of such a lease were wholly unsupported by any evidence. But the appellants
complain of such :findin:~. N owhe~re do they point
r·nt- any evidence adduced by them in sup·port of such
a lease. As to the kind of lease alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint the record is barren of any evidence.
Whether the plaintiffs may wholly abandon the kind
,.__,~ l0'1t"~ so alleged by them and rely for recovery
upon the lease alleged by the defendant, will presPntlv be noted. The point now being considered is
that the complaints made by the appellants that
fin din~
2 "\Vi th re·spect to the pleadings and find ..
ing No. 3 with respect to the want of evidence to
snnport the lease alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint,
.a.re ,\. .holly groundless: and no evidence -not any~
thing- is pointed to by the, appellants to support
their contention thn.t such findings are not supported. What conclusion is to be deduced from
4

No.
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such findi~g.s is another matter and will p~resently
be considered .
Let it first be noted what the facts are, and as
found by the court in such particular. Counsel's
argument on conclusions based on groundless challenges of such £indings does not get them anywhere. Counsel do not consider the case upon finding's 2 or 3 as made by the court. They, in effect,
now say that no reliance is placed upon the lease
as alleged in the complaint of pJaintiffs, and no
claim now made that the de!endant, as alleged by
the plaintiffs, 'vent into possession or occupied the
premises, ''in virtue of such lease,'' as in the complaint alleged. They now in effect proceed on the
theory a.s an abandonment of the le~se p}eaded hy
them, and now claim that the defendant went into
possession and occupied the premises for a period
of nearly six years in virtue of the lease pleaded by
, tl~(· defendant but which the plaintiffs averred was
absolutely void, notwithstanding the pleaded and
found part performance and estoppel.
In this connection, let us now look at the conclusions of la"7 with respect to findings 2 and 3.
By conclusion of la·w· No. 1 (Ab. 37), the court
stated that the plaintiffs, to recover, were required
to do so upon the case tnade by their eornplaint, and
not upon one which may have been developed by
proof, and as no suc}l ~ase as alleged by the plaintiffs was established by evidence, and as no judgment could be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
except on proof e~tablishing the cause of action as
:1.lleged by the plaintiffs in their complaint, it fol]o,ved, that the eomplaint a.gainf?t the defendant had
to be dismissed for want of ev~ence to sust,ain the
cause of action as alleged in th~ complaint.
Bv conclusion No. 2. (Ab. 37), th~ court further
·stated. that the plaintiffs were not entitled to support their eause of action by recourse to the alleged
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lease in the defendant's ansvver and the evide·nce
adduced by the defendant in support thereof, for
that the plaintiffs by their verified replies to the
defendant's ans,ver denied the existence, validity
and binding effect of the lease as s.o alleged
in the defendant's answer, declared that such
leas.e under the statute of frauds was absolutely void, and that in such case the court stated
a plaintiff could not aid his cause by recourse to
material allegations of his adversary, which, as
here, by replies, \vere specifically denied and by evidence of the plain tiffs controverted.
It is thus seen that no evidence whatever was
given to sustain the lease as alleged in the complaint
of plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs, having denied the
alleged lease pleaded in the answer of the defendant and by evidence controverted its existence, cannot now as an aider to their cause of action avail
themselves of the allegations ,in such respect -contained in the answer, nor the evidence· given with
respect thereto, and particularly may not now
accept a part and reject a part thereof, or seek to
avail themselves of \vhat 'in such particular they
deem suitable and repudiate and reject or hold
for naught what may be deemed unfavorable to
them.
It, of course, is familiar doctrine that a mere
imperfect or defectiv~ complaint or pleading often
is and may be aided by a pleading of the adversary.
1 Bancroft Code Pll., Sec. 737, p. 1035.
Robbins v. Duggins, 61 Utah 542; 216 Pa.c.
232.
But just as well is it established that a plaintiff
may not rely upon a pleading of his advers,ary
where he has denied in his reply the alle~g1ation.s
\Vhich he later relies on for assistance.
1 Bancroft Code Pl.j Sec. 738, p. 1038.
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Worley v. Peterson, (Utah) ; 12 Pac. (2d)
579, on rehearing p. 587.
Mantle v. White, 47 ~font. 234; 132 Pac. 22.
Greenberg v. German-American Ins. Co.,
83 Ore. 660; 160 Pac. 536.
Just as vte~ll is it established and it is jus,t as
fundamental that a. plaintiff must recover, if at all,
upon the cas.e made by his complaint, and not upon
a case which may be develop.ed by proof; and that
a judgment cannot be sustained, unless the proof
establishes the cause of action alleged in the complaint, even though a different cause of action may
be fully proved.
1 Bancroft Code Pl., 984,
_and numerous cases there cited in support thereof.
Such holding is. in line ,vith th(:\ well established and
familiar rule or maxim, allegatta et probata; alle . .
gations and proof must correspond. This Court in
numerous cases has frequently so applied the rule.
Nor can the plaintiffs help themselves by
claiming a mere variance, for that the clairn or
cause of action alleged in the comp1aint is unsupported by any evidence, not in some me-re particular· or particulars, but unsupported in its gen-·
era.l scope and meani~g, and hence, the case may
not be deemed a variance, but a failure of proof.
R. S. 1933, Sec. 104-14-2.
'I' his is particularly true,· for that the lease alleged
jn the defendant's answer is adverse to any kind of
a lease alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint. As
heretofore stafed, the only evidence as to the making of any lease is that contained in the defendant's
answer. But the plaintiffs say such leasH is absolutely void and is for naught. There being no evidence to sustain any other lease in fact, or one as
in the complaint alleged, it follows that the plaintiffs' alleged cause of action stands unsupported hy
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence, and hence, is 'vholly insufficient to support any kind of judgment on the c.ause of action
as in the complaint alleged.
,,~ e kno"" counsel in their brief in effect abanJon their complaint and the lease as therein alleged, p~oint to no evidence which supports that
kind of a lease, no longer claim that the defendant
went into possession of the leased premises as alleged by then1 in virt.ue of the lease as stated in
the complaint, but now assert that the defendant
\Yent and for six years continued in possession under the lease pleaded by it in its ans,ver, which
lease the plaintiffs no"\v assert was absolutely void,
because by its terms being a- lease for more ~han
one year and it not being shown that A. H. Ball, the
admitted a.g1ent of the predecessors and grantors.
of the plaintiffs, who had exclusive charge and
management of the premises and who as such agent
111ade the lease in the name of and for the use and
benefit of such predecessors, had authority ~in
writing to make such a lease, and therefore it was
absolutely void, and thus the plaintiffs as they
assume could not change their position and ass.ert
that the defendant, instead of entering into the possession of the premises in virtue of the lease· set
forth in the complaint, did so in virtue of the lease
set forth in the defendant's answer, which now as
they assert gives the plaintiffs as the grantee of
such nredccessor~J the right in law to treat and
regard the possession of the defendant as a mere
tenant from month to month, which tenancy by giving- notice, could be terminated at any time and. the
defendant dispossessed of the premises, regardless
of nart performance by the defendant or of benefits received by the predecessors. of the plaintiffs
l""" PVPn by the plaintiffs themselves.
"Whatever merit there may be to such a .contenHon, \vhich presently ,vill be considered~ still, no
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such cause of action or one on any such a theory is
pleaded in the complaint of the p~laintiffs. As has
been s.een, what is alleged by the p~laintiffs in their
complaint is that their predecessors and grantors
made and entered into a lease with the defendant,
1easing and demisin;g the premises to it from month
to month at $70.00 a month and nearly two years
thereafter "by mutual agreement" between the
parties, the rental was increased to ·$90.00, and ''by
virtue of such a lease, (not by virtue of any other
lease), the defendant went into possession of the
'P'remises and still continues to hold and occupy the
same,'' until the filing of the plaintiffs' complaint
iu this action, on or about August 2·2, 1939, a period
of nearly six years. It is difficult to conceive two
theories more inconsistent 'vith each other than the
one alleged in the comyJaint and the one in the defendant's ans,ver and denied by the plaintiffs by
their reply, and who now in effect seek assistance
by "\Vhat was solemnly denied by them. No such
Jiberality in pleadings - to permit one to recover
on 'vhat is denied by him - may be indulged by the
most optimistic reformer without casting to the
wind the very basic and fundamental p~rinciples of
y,leadings .and to ignore the use and purpose of
t.hem.
.And further, it indisputably was shown that
the plaintiffs, prior to their purchase of the Eagle
Block, including the premis.es in question, had not
only constructive notice, but had actual knowledge,
of the defendant's lease and knew that the defend• ant was in possession in pursuance thereof, had
different .conversations ,vith the defendant conrerning it, had examined a copy of the lease with
their counsel, knew and were told that the term
period of the lease had not expired until September,
1n4J. (A b. 97, 108; Tr. 313, 379, 381), and of course,
having examined the lPase, the plaintiffs knew of
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the provision of the lease, (Ab. 14), that for and in
consideration of the expenditure by the defendant,
on or before lvlay 1, 19J3, in making permanent improvements to the extent of $1,000.00 in and upon
the s.tore and basement leased to the defendant a
term p·eriod of the lease was granted for an additional five years from September 25, 1936, or to
September 25, 1941, and upon the payment of
monthly rentals by the defendant of $90.00 for such
additional five-year period.

Confessedly, and as hereinbefore stated, no
evidenee was ,given to support the aveTment in_ the
complaint of plaintiffs that on or ahout May 1, 1935
"by mutual agreement" or Ly any agree1nent then
made, "the rental was fixed at ·$90.00 a month."
Whatever arrangement there \Vas between the parties as to an increase of rental to $90.00 a month
·wa.s as stated in the written lease attached to the
defendant's answer, that in consideration of the defendant making the pern1anent improven1ents to the
extent of ·$1,000.00 and paying the increased rental
of $90.00 a month, a period of the lea8e was granted
for an additional five years. All that vvas part and
parcel of the· lease itself entered into and granted
September 25, 1933. Further than that, there was
110 evidence of any such increased monthly rental.
For various and quite apparent reasons, the pla!nliffs in drawing their complaint, did not d~sire· to
reflect th~ true status of such increased rental or
the consideration or condition upon \vhich such
monthly rental 'vas to h0 increased, and as stated in
the defendant's lease. · So the matter was smoke-"
~creened by an averment in the complaint of plaintiffs that on May 1, 1935, there V\ras an independent
''mutual agreement'' entered into by and between
the parties fixing the monthly rental at. $90.00, when
in truth and in fact, there was no such separate and
·independent agreement, and no evidence "\vhatever
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:to support s.uch an averment as alle;ged by the
plaintiffs.
If, therefore, p~aragraphs 2 and 3 of the court's
findings are supported by the record, (and not anything pointe·d out wherein they are not so supported), and if p·aragrap~hs 1 and 2 of the court's
conclusions of law are under the law as heretofore
·stated, correctly drawn and stated, then the judgment of the court below must be affirmed, reg~rd
less of any and all other questions presented by the
appellants.

PLAINTIFF'S POINTS
There are some 42 assignments. Fourteen of
them relate to the fi~dings and conclusions. Under
1assign.m.ents 10 to 21, inclusive, are grouped about
42 exhibits of the defendant admitted in evidence.
.Assignment 10 is a fair samp~le. It is rather a. large
load in one shotgun. Looks like shrapnel. Twentythree of the assignments relate to examination and
cross examination of witnesses. Not anything is
exhibited in the abstract or even in the plaintiff8.'
.briefs to show irrelevancy or immateriality or any
abuse of dis.cretion with resp~ect to such alleged
complaints. Nor is there anything exhibited in the
abstract or in the brief of counsel showing even the
substance or contents of the various exhibits put
]n evidence with the excep tion of one or two. What
references are made with resp·ect to them are merely by numbers. To ascertain any idea of their contents requires resort to the transcript to which the
exhibits are attached, quite a bunch to find what
i~ desired. They relate to the making of written
1flase~, the manner in which the agents of the owners of the premises and prede-cessors of the plaintiffs conducted the business., the reports· made by
1
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their agents from tin1e to t.in1e concerning the collection of rents, leasing of premises, payment of
taxes, borro\ving n1oney, n1aking repairs and other
1natter~ pertaining to the business ~arried on and
handled by the agents of such predecessors.
A reading of the transcript shows that counsel
for the plaintiffs objected to about everything
att<-•nlpted to be shown by the defendant. They objected to the cross exan1ination of their witnesses
and to the direct examination of the defendant's
witnesses; objected to putting in evidence the written lease made for and on behalf of the plaintiffs'
predecessors and attached. to the· defendant's an-·
swer, the manner in which the busines.s was carried
on by the admitted agentR of the plaintiffs' predecessors, the leasing of the premises., the collection of rentals and making monthly reports thereof, making repairs, and paying taxes, etc. 'rhey
even objected to putting in evidence the lease, Exhibit 28, attached to the defendant's answer. .LL\8
heretofore shown, no evidence \Vas gi,.,.Pn on behalf
of the plaintiffs as to their alleged lease or as to
any lease, oral or written, between the parties.
Still they objected to proving or admitting in evidence the lease attached to the defendant's answer.
Had they been successful in keeping it out, there
'vould have be·en no evidence whatever as to any
kind of a tenancy existing between the p~a.rties and
not anythjng to Rhovv the circumstances or conditions under which the defendant was or had been
~ n possession of the premises for nearly six years,
in which cas.e the plaintiffs would have been left
wandering in the woods and lost as to how they got
in or how to get out. In other words, the plaintiffs
~oug-ht to have the court declare the lease attached
to the defendant's ansvver for naught and void, regardless of giving the defendant an opportunity to
shovv the circumstances and conditions under which
the l~a~c wras made-, part performance by the de-
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fendant, benefits received by the predecessors of
the plaintiffs, actual knowledge of the plaintiffs, of
the defenda.nt's lease before they p·urchas.ed the
premises and of the circumstances of the defendant's poss.ession and the making of permanent improvements by it in pursuance of and reliance upon
the lease.
Thus, the appellants by their brief note: (1)
that A. II. Ball, the admitted agent of the prede-cessors of the plaintiffs., was not authorized in writing
to e·xecute the lease for and on behalf of the owners
of the premises; (2} that the lease was void because
not executed on behalf of all the owners; (3) that
the defendant had not acted in good faith; ( 4) that
there was no evidence to show an estoppel, etc.;
(5} that no notic~ was. given to the owners themselves of any extension of the lease from three to
five additional years, or that the owners in writing
had consented thereto, and no evidence to show
that the defendant had expended $1,000.00 in permanent imp·rovements.; (6) that the plaintiffs were
not liable for attorney's fees ; and ( 7) that most of
the findings and conclusions of law were erroneous
\vithout sufficiently specifying the particulars
thereof. No direct reference in counsel's brief is
tnade or any discussion had in respect of the
numerous. assignments made relating to the examination of witnesses or to the various exhibits adtni tted in evidence. As to that, they say, they desire their dis.cussion on other matters to he considered. When the issues presented by the pleadings and the specific and complete findings made
as to all material issues are first considered, ·as they
should be, and when then appellants' brief is .considered, this Court cannot fail to s.ee how scantily
the findings a.re regarded, and in many particulars
disregarded by their brief. "'What reference they
m9ke to evidence, they pojnt chieflv to testimony
by- some of their witnesses. But this is a la'v case,
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and "There findings are ma.de as to p·articular issues,_
the evidence and the reasonable inferences deducible
therefron1 and from the p·roven facts and circum..~
stances in support thereof, 'vill be accepted rather
than testimony on behalf of the appellants in conflict therewith.
As abstract propositions, we do not dispute
that a tenant \Yithout authority in writing may not,
\vithout the kno\\Tledge or consent of hi8 principal
bind him as to the gTanting or conveyance of real
estate or any interest therein of his principal, or
to the granting of a leasehold interest therein for a
period longer than one year, particularly where .the
agreement or contract is still executory.
Nor do we disp~ute the proposition that a cotenant cannot make a valid lease of premises aS}
against other co-tenants so as to give the lessee a
right to the exclusive possession of any p~art of the
land demi8ed, unless he was authorized_ to act as
their agent in making the lease and unless ratified
by them.
As well, however, is it settled that where a lea.s.e
for more than one year is made by an agent in
charge of premises and having complete management thereof for his principal or principa!s, though
the agent is not authorized in writing to. make such
a lease, yet, where the parties had knowledge of the
making of it by his or their agent; accepted and received the benefits thereof and part perforn1ance on
the part of the lessee by making permane·nt improvements on the demised premises, or otherwisP
earried out the terms and conditions of the lease
on his p~art to be performed and the payment of
rentals as by the lease stip.ulated, or where
other\vise to permit the principal, or princip~als,
to invoke the statute of frauds would h~ave
in effect worked a fraud upon the lessee,
the principal, or principals, will be held estopped
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to deny that his or their agent was not authorized
in w:riting to make the lease, or to declare the lease
veid or for naught. That is this case. Tha.t is what
the court found and determined. That, we say, is
not only supported by sufficient evidence, hut by
the great weight of the evidence.
Let us first get a. p•roper background for all
this. Prior to September, 1933, when the lease was
made to the defendant, the owners of the Eagle
Block .consisted of ·w. P. Noble Comp·any, a co:r:poration organized under the laws of Utah~ owning
a one-half interest in the Eagle Block, the Fred
Bragg Estate owning a one-fourth, and the Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha, a one-fourth.
Robert Gould-Smith, the secretary and treasurer
of the Noble Company, resided in San Francisco.
Miss Noble was president of the comp·any, residing
in Salt Lake City; but Smith as such secretary and
treasurer transacted substantially all the business
of the company with respect to the block, first
through H. T. Ball, the admitted agent of such ownPrs, and thereafter ·A. H. Ball, their agent, with
respect to leasing the premises, collecting rents,.
making rep,airs, and gene·rally looking after the interest of the owners in respect of the Eagie building. Smith, the active representa,tive of the Noble
Company, then and prior thereto resided in San
Francisco, California. All the heirs and those interested in the ],red Bragg Estate resided in Wyoming and their business with respect to the E>agle
huilding was handled for them by their attorney C.L.
Brome at Basin, Wyoming; and those interes,ted in
the Stockyards Bank at South Omaha, resided in
O)naha, all non-residents of Utah. It is not clear
on the record just when the bank acquired its interest. Som.e refe-rence is made that they at one
time held a mortgage lien on the buildin!r which
was foreclosed; but just when that '\va.s, is ·~ot defSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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initely shown. Ho,vever: it is clear that the bank
at its foreclosure p-roceedings or other,vise acquired
it~ iuterest some tiine prior to ·l~)32. See defendant's bxhibit No. 1.
~'he defendant's lease is dated September 25,
1933, but in fact was not signed until October, 1933
{Tr. 253) or November, 1933, after A. H. Ball returned fron1 Chicago (Ab. 82-83), and then was by
him sig~1ed as agent for the Stockyards National
Bank of South Omaha, the W. P. Noble Company
and the Fred Bragg· Estate. Some time prior to
lviay 15, 1935, the exa.ct time again is not stated, the
Stockyards National Bank conveyed its one-fourth
interest to ·William H. Dressler and Fred E. Ho¥ey,
as trustees for liquidation. (Ab. 65). B'ut, as the
record shows, such interest thereafter, as before,
\vas treated and referred to by the parties as still the
interest of the Stockyards National Bank. On May
27, 1939, the Noble Company conveyed its one-half
interest by warranty deed to the plaintiffs; the
heirs of the Bragg Estate on May 13, 1939 conveyed
their one-fourth interest to the plaintiffs, and on
May 12, 1939. William H. Dressler a.nd Fred E.
Hovey, .as trustees, conveyed their interest as such,
to the plaintiffs. Until then all reports of husiness
affairs and transactions concerning the E·agle Block
and remittances of collections of rent were made,
one-half to the Noble Company, one-fourth to the'
Fred Bragg Estate and one-fourth to the Stockvards National Bank or to the bank in care of Wil.
iiam H. Dressler; and in such manner without objections such reports and remittances were so received and acknowledged.
For many years and until his death, which
occurred a few days prior to Sep~temher 2·5, 1933}
W. T. Gunter, an attorney at Salt Lake City, and
as their counsel, represented all of the owners of
the Eagle building and advised them as to their
several interests in the building and handled t.he,ir
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legal matters with respect thereto (Ab. 80). For 17
years and until his death in June, 1930, H. T Ball,
residing in Salt Lake City, was employed by all of
the owners as their ag:ent in managing, h~dling
and caring for the block or building, to procure
tenants therefor, to demise, .lease and let various
parts· thereof to different tenants, collect the rentals of premises so leased by him, pay the taxes on
the building, make and keep it in repair, keep the
premises insured, and remit the rentals each month
to the respective owners, and in the performance
of s~uch duties he entered into written leases, some
of them for three years) ·prepared by Attorney
O·unter for and on behalf of the owners and predecessors of the plaintiffs and were signed by H. T.
Ball, as agent for and on their behalf. See Exhibits
27, 26 and 2'5 in the transcript.
0

H. T. Ball died in June, 1930. For a yea.r and
a half prior to his death and while he was sick, his
son, A. H. Ball, assisted him in collecting the rents
and helped in looking after the prop~erty, and conr;ulted Gunter with respect thereto. The son thns
became familial.. vvith the work theretofore performed by his father (.£ottb. 68) . That his father had
signed written leases p.repared by Gunter for and
on behalf of the p~redecessors of the plaintiffs for
a period of more than one year. was clearly shown
by the evidence. At his father 'R death, his son, A. H.
Ball, bec:ame the agent of the ov1ners and predecessors of the plaintiffs., at which time there were at
least s.even leases in writing executed by his father
and given to various tenants in possession, (Ab. 69;
Tr.178), all of which were p~rep:ared by ~unter for
H. T. Ball to sigtn and 'vhich he did· sign for and on
behalf of the o~rners and pTedecessors of the p~lain
tiffs. ·When H. T. Ball died, Gunter told A. H.
Ball to look after the business a.s his father had. and
to collect the rents and put them in a bank and ~ake
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StateiUents Of rentHl8 \\Thich Were O~l( 'd by
Gunter and sent to the resp.ective owners, W. P.
Koble C\nnpa.ny, to Charles R. Brome for the Bragg
~state, and to the Stockyards National Bank of
South Omaha. That \Yas in June, 1930. Smith
attended the funeral of H. T. Ball. He told the son
to look after the business as his father had done.
A few days thereafter he wrote a letter from San
Francisco to Gunter to that effect. The letter advi~ed Gunter that as A. H. Ball knew all about the
property, he ad\ised it would be logical to have him
handle the work the same as his father had done.
Gunter at that tirne also wrote letters to the Stockyards National Bank and to the attorney representing the Bragg Estate-, both of whom in reply also
stated to let the son handle the business the same
as hi_s father had. (~~b. 72, :·3; Tr. 184, 185, 186).
They were written and replies received shortly
after the death of H. T. Ball. They, with many
other letters, writings and documents from the predecessors of the plaintiffs concerning; transactions
had between them and Gunter, came into his hands
and were kept by him. When Gunter died Septemb8r 23~ 1933, his folks shortly the-reafter left Utah
and much of such and similar matters were de . .
stroyerl hy th2m, thinkjn~ they no longer were of
a.ny consequence (Ab. 77). However, the letters
written hy Gunter and the replies thereto concerning
the emp1oyment of li. H. Ball 'vere by Gunter shown
to Ball who testified from memory as to their contPnt~. As to some (Yf them, he '\vas corroborated by
testimony or his wife.
OUt

Thus A. H. Ball, as the agent for all the owners,
took charge of the Eagle building and managed and
handled the business just as his father had done.
There is no substantial dispute as to that. Some of
those who came to Ball to rent premises in the
building, desired written leases. He ga:ve such
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leases just as his father had. Gunter, until his
death, prepared the leases to be signed by A. H.
Ball, as the .agent of the owners of the building, just
as he had done when H. T. Ball was the agent (Ab.
73-75). In May, 1932 such a lease (See defendant's
Ex. 1), was prepared by Gunter to be and which was
signed by A. H. Ball, as the agent of the Stockyards
National Bank of South Omaha, the W. P. Noble
Company and the Bragg Estate, demising and
leasing the identical property, 79 West Second South
street, to others for a period of three years, which
premises were later leas~d to the defendant. From
June, 1930, after his father's death and until the
premises were sold to the plaintiffs in May, 1939,
.:\. H. Ball managed and handled the p·rop~_rty just
as his father had, gave written leas.es~ first prepared by Gunter and later by Cluff, collected the
rentals, looked after the repairs of the building,
paid the taxes, kept the premises in repair and
\vhen necessary borrowed money at the bank to pay
taxes and make repairs, sent one-half of the rentals to Smith at San F~ancisco for the Noble Company, one-fourth to C. L. Brome in Wyoming for
the Bragg Estate, and one-fourth to the Stockyards
~iational Bank at Omaha or to the bank in care of
W. L. Dressler, sent monthly statements and !~:
ports to each concerning the business handled by
him and had numerous correspondence with them
cnncerning the same, some of which were put in
evidence. But here again, let it be noted that letters, writings and documents received by him from
the respective owners concerning the business
l1andled by him were kept at his. residence, which in
1934 or 1935 was partly destroyed bv fire and with
it many p·ersonal effects, including letters, writings
and documents and correspondence between him
Hnd the several owners.
We now come to the employment of Mr. Cluff,
an attorney at Salt Lake City. Counsel in their
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brief sny (page 30) that A. H. Ball, after Gunter's
death, ''hired Cluff as attorney for his principals.''
They then say '' B.all at every stag1e rendered such
help as he could to the defendant (Nick Floor, Inc.~),
and the attorney he claims to have hired for his
principals is in the employ of the defendant in this
action.'' The fact is, Attorney Cluff wa.s not hired
by Ball, but by the owners of the premises, and
predecessors of the plaintiffs. At page 195 of the
transcript, A. H. Ball in giving his, testimony, was
asked:
'' Q. Had you received directions from
anybody about \Vho to consult after Mr.
Gunter's death~
A. I wrote letters and explained tha~t I
had had business with Mr. Cluff and he
was a very good lawyer, and I s.uggested
him to take and rep!reRent me, the s.ame as
Gunter had, (who without any substantial
di~pute was in the employ of and represented the predecessors of the plaintiffs),
and they said it was all right.
Q. ·Who said it was all right~
A. ~fr. Brome of the Bragg Estate, the _
Stockyards National Bank and Mr. Smith."

On pages 224-225 on cross examination, after testi(ying· that he had advised with Smith concerning
things in connection with the building1 whenever
occasion arose, then was asked:

"Q. And you also consulted 'vith Mr.
Gunter about it during his lifetime~
A. All the time.
Q.
~fr.

Yes. Now you say that you wrote to
Gould-Smith concerning the employ-
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.ment of Cluff as~ your attorney in your
capacity of agent, as agent of the building~
A. I did,''
~.nd when asked how soon he did that after Gunter's death, he said it may be a week or two, but
that it was prior to the making of the lease with
the defendant, and then was asked:

"Q. So that you didn't write 1\tir. Gould..
Smith about the employment of Mr. Cluff
prior to the execution of this le.ase ( tfie
lease to the defendant)~
A. I wrote him as soon as Mr. Gunter had
passed away, and he was handling all the
things, and I went up and I talked to Cluff.
(As heretofore shown, the lease was not sigmed or
entered into until in October or November, 1933,
and was da.ted back to Sep~temher 25, 1933). He then
further was a.sked and answered that some of the
writings and documents were destroyed by fire and
·some were not.
On page 21 of the appellants.' brief, they say
that, ''Nick Floor (the manager of the defendant,
Nick Floor, In.c., and who transacted all'the business for and on its behalf), testified that at the
time he secured the lease (the lease here in question, defendant's Ex. ·28), he consulted with and
submitted it to an attorney, Mr. Knowlton,'' and
referred to Abs,tract 106-107. There, the abstract
shows that Nick Floor not only consulted Attorney
l{nowlton, but as tes,tified to by him, he "had an
attorney when we fixed the lease. I showed the
lease (Ex. 28) to my attorney. _My q..ttorney was
Horace Knowlton.'' (See also transcrip~t p~age 371).
There it also shows that when the lease was 'fixed
up in October or November, 1933, and dated back,
Cluff prepared the lease and that the terms thereof
'vere talked over by Kno,vlton as thr defendant's
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attorney, and "~ith Cluff and Ball, representing the
le~sor8 . .:-\_nd here let it again be· noted that H. T.
Ball, until his death, and A. H. Ball thereafter consulted \Yith and \Yas advised by Gunter until his
death concerning the management and hruJdling of
the property and the making of leases, as well as, to
all other leg~al matters and business affairs relating
to the property. Cpon the great weight of the evidence, no claim may be made, that Gunter was not
in the employ of a.nd did not represent the owners
of the prop·erty and the predecessors of the plaintiffs as their attorney. At least there \va.s ample
sufficient evidence, if not by a clear and manifest
\Yeight of the evidence, to sho_w that Gunter was so
en1ployed, and that after the death of Gunter, A. H.
Ball wrote to Smith, representing the Noble Company, to Brome representing the Bragg Estate, and
to Stockyards National Bank, suggesting the appointment of Cluff to represent him, ''the sa.me as
Gunter had,'' to which they replied that "it was
all right,'' the fair~ meaning of all of which is, that
Cluff was appointed and hired as the representative
of the owners and the predecessors of the plaintiffs, the same as Gunter had represented them, ·and
not that Cluff was hired simp~ly as the personal attorney of Ball. If all that Ball desired was merely
the employment of an attorney for himself, there
\vas no occasion to write to the owners or to anyone- about it. vV e thus say that the finding of the
r-0.urt (Ab. 28) that after the death of Gunter, I..J. E.
Cluff, an attorney at la,w, was employed by the predecessors of the :plaintiffs to take the -place of Attorney Gunter and that Cluff dre"r up the leas.e,
Ex. 2'8, demising the pre·mises to Nick Floor, Inc.,
as lessee, to be and "rhich was signed by A. H. B'all
for and on behalf of the predecessors of the plaintiffs, is well supported by the evidence. Until the
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time of the trial of this cause, there is no evidence
to show that Cluff at any time before was in the
emp~loy of or repres.ented the defendant or in a-ny
capacity had acted for it. None of the pleadings in
the cause were signed by him and a.t the beginning he
rlid not and had not appeared for the defendant. It
was not until after the replies of the plaintiffs and
on the first day of the trial of the caus:e that Cluff
ap~peared as additional counsel for the defendant to
defend the le·as.e which the plaintiffs (not their predecessors) asserted was void. Nor is there any evL
dence to support the statement of appellants that
Ball ''at every stage rendered such help as he could
to the defendant.'' To the contrary the evidence
and reports submitted by him to the owners show
that he handled and managed the premises to their
hest interest and that the tenant occupying 79
West 2nd South was a good tenant and promptly
paid the rent 'vhich he did} a.s some of the p~rior tenants had not done. The evidence further shows
(Tr. 196-198) that Floor, in obtaining the lease, indicated the kind of business he desired to carry on
in the leaseq. premises and desired a lease longel'
than merely from month to month.
We recognize that there is some conflict in the
evidence with respect to some or the s1atements
I.eretofore ma.de. The plaintiffs called but two witnesses. The first was Gould-Smith (Ab. 44). The
direct examination was very brief. After showing
he was the secretary and treasurer of the Noble
Company, about all testified to by him was that no
written authority was given by him to Arthur Ball
(A. H. Ball) to give any lease. But see his cross examination (Ab. 45_-61), in which he testified concerning the employment of H. T. Ball, and that
after his death A. H. Ball was employed by the
witness and by Gu.nter as the agent for the building
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to look after it., collect the rents and make rep~airs
for all of the owners. The cross examination is
lengthy. From letters and reports and other things
produc.ed by Smith and put in evidence as p·art of
the cross examination, it clearly showed, and the
'vitness testified, that A. H. Ball \Vas the agent for
the o'vners; that Ball 'vas keeping him advised as
to who the tenants were; sent him statements showing that after September, 1933 he was _rec~iving
$75.00 a month rental for the premises, in question,
79 ''rest Second South Street, but testified that he
did not notice that ''the defendant's rental. during
the period of nearly four years'' was increased from
$75.00 to $90.00 a month, when, at the same time,
the monthly reports of rentals received by him
showed that for nearly four years the defendant's
rental was so increased. He further testified that
Ball sent the portion of the monthly statements, of
rentals of the Noble Company to him, and p·resumed
he sent the Stockyards Bank their portion, as
well as to others interested in the premises.
The letters and reports furnished by Smith and
put in evidence showed also rep·airs. made by Ball,
the payment of taxes, the leasing of the premises,
and even the borrowing qf money on behalf of the
owners to pay taxes and rep·airs ; all of which were
reported to Smith and were approved by him. On
page 60 of the Abstract, the witness attempts to
explain why he did not discover the increased
rentals from $75.00 to $90.00, notwithstanding the
reports of rentals each month showed such increa8e,
for the reason, as he testified, that he did not follow
the reports very carefully.
He further testified that Ball had not told him
that he had given leases, but "h·ad not asked him if
he had given any;'' that they discussed the buildjng and the rentals and the possibility of s.ales, and
that ''on my instructions the bank would let him
1
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{Ball) have the money, and my instructions were
to pay the note from the rentals received;'' which
instructions "\\rere carried out by Ball. A fair interpretation of the testimony of this wit:p.ess, as
disclosed by the transcrip~t, shows that he knew that
;the defendant was in possession of the p~remises
froin September, 1933 to and including the time the
premises were sold in May, 1939, a period of nearly
six years; that for the first three years defendant
paid a rental of $75.00 a month, and for the next
three years $90.00 a month; knew the manner in
which A. H. Ball was handling the prop,erty, and
leasing and collecting the rents, and that the tenant
in possession of the leased p~remises No. 79 West
SP.cond South, was so in possession under and in
pursuance of a lease other than merely from month
to month.
The next witness produced by the plaintiffs,
page 62 of the abstract, was William H. Dres.sler,
who had a permanent residence at Omaha, and a
temporary residence at Long Beach, California.
In portions of his testimony, he testified that he
'vas the grantee, together with Ford E. Hovey, of
a conveyance made to them by the Stockyards Nationa! Bank of South Omaha; that ''I don't think
I wrote a letter to A. H. Ball, after his father's
death, that I desired or requeRted said A. H. Ball
to collect the rents und look after the property and
carry on with the Ea.gle Block as his. fa.ther had
done;" that he had not informed A. H. Ball, either
orally or in writing that he could enter into a lease
;.or leases other than from month to month (which
was denied by the testimony of Ball), and that he
'did not know that A. H. Ball had given a lease for
a longer period until in June, 1939, when he
learned sneh fact from the new owners; which
als.o was denied by Ball. But again, see his
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ciasive) . There, he testified that he had acquired
a one-fourth interes.t. from the Stockyards National
Bank in October, 1~)~9; that A.. H. Ball of Salt Lake
'()ity ·lvas ·i·n chaTge of the building ~and that h.e had
not Jnade any change ht the p·ersons or agents who
we·re looking after the rental of the building and
collecting the rents; that he had not done ~anythting
to find o~tt .zvho the tenants ~vere, or what rents w-ere
being paid; that he received ''a monthly financial
~ta ten1ent sho\ving the amount of rents -collected
and it::; disposition. I am attaching the statement
('~f J anua1·y, 1939.
The others are in the same
form;'' that he was not acquainted with the father
of A. H. Bill, but, so far as he knew, the father collected the rents, paid the taxes., and disbursed th~
remainder to parties of interest;· and that after his
death, the son looked after the renting of the build..
ing, the collection of rents and the disbursement of
them; that Gunter '''vas not my attorney in looking
after the building and employing agents.;'' that
ihe had had no letters from Gunter, a;nd
had not given A. H. Ball any instructions whatev.er
regarding the renting of the building; and "did not
instruct A. H. Ball to enter into a lease from month
to month," in fact said he had not given Ball any
instructions . He further testified he had ''no attorney in Salt Lake,'' and had no information of
the giving of any lease by Ball until June, 1939,
after the sale of the premises- which was denied
by Ball. However, he further testified that''A. H. Ball was looking after my interest in renting the building. I did not make any inquiries. concerning the tenants or the amount of rent they were
paying. I dealt with A. H. Ball. I made no inquiries as to what leases the tenants had or what
rentals \vere being paid;" that A. H. Ball collected
the rent from the tenants and remitted the same to
the various o'\\rners as their interest appeared; that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

he made no inquiry of A. H. Ball as to the nature
of the tenancy ·of any tenant; that he first came to
Salt Lake City in November, 1937, met A. H. Ball
,at that time, went to the Eagle Block with him,
that Ball showed him the building from the exterior and the ground that went with it; that he
did not s.ee a single tenant; that he did not know
if the defendant was a tenant in the building·; that
he did not recall seeing the sign, '' Golden Gate
Beer Garden, Nick Floor, Inc.''; that ''I made no
inquiries a.s to the nature of the tenancy of the
defendant. I did not see the improvements that
the defendant had placed upon said premis,es. I
did not know his rental was increased from $75.00
to ·$90.00 per month;" that ''I acquired an interest
in the property in question p~rior to May 15, 1935.
At no time did I make any 'inquiry as to who the
tenants were, what rent was. being p·aid, and the
nature of the tenancy. The Stockyards National
Bank conveyed a one-fourth interest to :me and
others a.s trustees for liquidation." (Ab. 66).
The testimony of this witness. was . given by
deposition at Long Beach, California. He attached
to his deposition a report for January, 1939. received by him showing the amount of rental of the
premises in question to be $90.00 a month, and
that su-ch report of collections of rents, was the
same as other reports of rentals received by him.
l~rom the testimony of this witness, it is, not clear
just when he acquired an interest in the premises.
On his cross examination {Ab. 63) he testified that
in October, 1929, ''a one-fourth interest was conveyed to me from the Stockyards National Bank
of .. South Omaha.'" That is not true, for he himself further testified (Ab. 66) that the ''Stockvards National Bank c.onveyed a one-fourth interest to me and others, as trustees for liquiroa.tion. ''
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He neYer had any interest other than that. of
trustee, and as such he and Hovey, a.s trustees,
'conveyed an undivided one-fourth interest in and
to the Eagle building or block to the plaintiffs.
Ho"~ever, as already stated, after such conveyance,
whatever the time the Stockyards. Bank conveyed
to Dressler and Hovey, as trustees, in liquidation,
whether in 1929 or at some other time p~rior to
1935, such interest of the Stockyards National
Bank as between the parties., was still carried on
1n the nan1e of the. bank until the conveyance to the
plaintiffs. (See letter of ~fay 11, 1936, part of Ex.
2:i, wherein ·w. H. Dressler, as oa.shier of the
l)tookyards National Bank. addressed a letter to
_A_. H. Ball at Salt Lake City for and on behalf or
the bank; and too let it hP noticed, defendant's
Ex. 1 where in May, 1932, a lease was pTep~ared
by \Y·. T. (hmter to be and which was signed by
:lt. H. Ball, as agent for the Stockyards National
Bank of South Omaha~ W. P. ~oble Company and
the Fred Bragg Estate).
As thus disclosed by his cross examination this
witness, from the time he as trustee acquired an
interest in the pTemises and until the conveyance
to the plajntiffs, had made no inquiry and knew
nothing as to the tenants, their leases, possession or
occupancy of the premises, knew nothing, did nothing; like the traditional monk, saw not, heard not,
spoke not, except for a period of six years without
complaint or objection received from those in charge
of the premises monthly reports of rentals and oth~r
f-~tatements in the name of the Stockyards Naitonal
Bank. What a trustee! ·What diligence exercised
for and on behalf of his ces~tui que trust!
It is not necessary in detail to refer to the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant, the tes--
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timony of A. H. Ball, and exhibits (direct examination A b. 88 to 99; Re~called 182; cross examination 85-87); and the testin1.ony of Nick Floor,
(direct examination 88 to 101, and Exhibits, his
cross examination 102-108). The contentions of
a.pp~ellants are chiefly based on the te8timony of
their witnesses and upon objections to the cross
examination thereof, and objections to the testimony and exhibits adduced on behalf. of the defendant. They p·articularly claim that the lease
(Ex. 28) given the defendant and executed by A. JI.
Ball as agent for and on behalf of the Noble Company, the Fred Bragg Estate and the Stockyards
National Bank was not executed for and on behalf of the true or all of the owners as lessors,
because, as they say, the bank before tha.t had conveyed its one-fourth interest to Dressler and Hovey,
as trustees in liquidation, and that the lease was
'not signed by any of the heirs of the Bragg Estate;
and further, because no evidence was adduced as
'they say, to show authority of A. H. Ball to ex'Ccute the lease for and on behalf of the owners or
lessors. As to this, we refer particularly to the
findings of the court (Ab. 28, 29, 30), which we
submit are supported by ample and sufficient evidence, though in particulars it may be claimed
there is some conflict therein.
In view. of such findings, the appellants may
not fold their arms and proclaim that the defendant must show some written instrument signed by
the owners authorizing Ball to give a written lease
for more than one year. The record shows. that
from at least 1922 until the conveyance of the p~rem
i~es to the plaintiffs in 1939, a period of 17 years,
the parties· treated and referred to the one-fourth
interest of the Braggs. as the "rred Bragg Estate"
nnd in that name were all reports of rentals and
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other reports and statements designated. (See defl'ndant 's ~x. ~5; ~6, 27 and other numerous exhibits) sent to and transnlitted to C. L. Brome,
lt.ttorney for the Fred Bragg Estate and for the
heirs thereof, and as such "\Yere received and
ackno,vledged by him. A. H. Ball testified t;h.at
l'rom the time he took charge of tlie premises in
June, 1930, and until the- conveyance to the plaintiffs and "~hile he had full charge, management
and handling of the premises he, and prior there ...
to his father, so and in such name, remitted to
Brome, as the attorney for the Fred Bragg Estate,
1·eports of rentals and other reports and that the
~arne were so received and a.cknowledg'ed by him.
There does not seem to be any dispute a.s to that.
From the time the Stockyards N a.tional Bank
by foreclosure of its lien acquired its one-fourth
interest in the premises, the exact time of which
is not clearly shown, but which at least was. prior
to May 5, 1932, and until the conveyance to the
plaintiffs, reports of rentals as to th~ interest of
the bank, as well as other reports and statements,
twere tranEmitted to and in the name of the hank,
or in the name of the bank in care of W. H.
J)ressler, and as such were so recei,red and acknowledged. A. H. Ball so testified and there does not
seem to be any dispute as to that. ~d. without dispute, it also was shown that whatever in~erest Dressler and Hovey acquired in and to the bank's interest
was only as trustees, and as trustees, and no_t other'vise, they conveyed an undivided one-fourth interest'
to the p·la.intiffs ; and~ too, lPt it not be overlooked
tl1nt the rentals and other benefits so transmitted to
the bank and received by Dressler, were not only
as to the interest he had, but for the whole of the
undivided one-fourth interest acquired by both
Dressler and Hovey as trustees, and without evi-
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dence to the contrary, of which there is none, it
will be presumed Dressler a.ccounted to Hovey or
to his cestui que trust for the whole of the rentals
and benefits received for such undivided one-fourth
tintere-st. No evidence was given to shQ"\V that
Hovey had not consented to or acquiesced in all
that his co-trustee had done, or that Hovey was
\v~thout kn;owledge thereof.
The numerous cases thus cited by the appellants to the effect that one co-tenant cannot give
·exclusive possession of an interest in real estate
Without authority of other co-tenants, or to which
'they had not consented or acquiesced therein, had
not reeeived the benefits thereof and refused to
he bound thereby, or cases where one of several
trustees without the consent or acquiescence of
other trustees conducted or transacted business
for the cestui que trust and where the other trustees
had no knowledge of such trans·actions and had not
cons.ented or acquiesced therein and had not received benefits therefrom and refused to be bound
by such transaction, are not applicable to cases
where as here such co-tenants or co-trus.tees had
received benefits thereof, as here shown, that they
had knowledge of the tenancy of the defendant for
a period of nearly six years and ha.d received, without comp•laint or objection, their just prop.ortion
of the rentals and other benefits of such tenancy.
Further as to this. Who here is complaining~
Certainly not trustee Hovey, nor even the traditional monk Dressler, nor the B,ragg Estate or any
l1eir thereof, not even the Noble Company, nor the
Btockyards Bank. Then 'vhy all this mess~ Let
the Court look at the deeds, plaintiffs' Ex. A, B
rD.nd c, whereby the Noble Company, the heirs of
the Bragg Estate and the trustees Dressler and
liovey conveyed the Eagh~ BloLi]c, i:ncludl.ng :the
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premises in question, wherein they ' ' war ran ted
irmnediate po.ssession to the grantees,'' notwithstanding they knew of the posses.sion and occupaney of the defendant as a tenant for a period
of nearly six years, and was in poss.ession when
the deeds were made, and that the grantees themselves before they purchased the premises had full
knowledge of the defendant's possession and occuy;ancy and of the terms and .conditions of its lease
under which it was in possession and had made
valuable improvements and well knew that under
the tern1s of its lease the defendant was entitled
to a continued possession of nearly two years more,
and that it claimed the right for such period t~
continue in possession, and so the court found
(Ab. 33-34), but notwithstanding all that, and with
full kno,Yledge of the claimed rights of the defendant, the plaintiffs, after such purchase, servP.d
notice on the defendant to vacate the premises, and
en his refusal to do so brought this action.
It, therefore, is unnecessary to review the
appellants' cited cases, for it is apparent that they
!lave no application either to the record or to the
findings. No doubt, the app~ellants may claim they
can make the same defens.e and contentions against
the defendant's lease and possession as the grantors themselves could have done. Let it be so.
1-Io,vever some of the representatives of the .grantors by their testimony, sought to disclaim knowl~
edge of the defendant's lease and of its possession
thereunder. But how stands the case as to the
plaintiffs, who before they purchased the premises,
indisputably had actual and full knowledge of the
defendant's lease and of the defendant's possession thereunder and of th·e terms ap.d conditions of
the lease and of the improvements and part performance made by the defendant and of its claimed
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right to continue in possession for nearly two
years more~ We shall see, when. presently we con~ider the question of estopp~el.
In view of all this, the appellants, nevertheless further say (their brief 21) that the defendant had not a.cted in good faith. To sup~port that
t.hey say that since he submitted the lease to his
counsel, Mr. ICnowlton, ''we must believe that he
(Floor) was told of the infirmities of the lease,"
because signed by an agent for and on behalf of
the lessors. No claim is made of any evidence to
show that :any information of such or of any infirmity of the lease was given Hoor or that the
lease for the reason stated or otherwise was infirm. "They s.ay that he was bound to ascertain the
·agent's authority to execute a lease for more than
one year. Here A. H. Ball, who admittedly as the
agent for the lessors, all of whom were nonresidents, had the management and handling of the
premises .and had full charge thereof for them with
authority to lease the p.remises and collect the rent:als, and that in such case what was so done by him
in the course of his employment will, until the contrary is/ shown, be presumed to have been done with
!authority. Had further inquiry been made by the
defendant, it would have been dis.closed that A. H.
Ball, since he had charge of the premises, gave
wrjtten leases for a p~eriod longer than one year,
;and as his father prior· thereto in charge of the
premises for many years had done. The claim of
~the defendant's bad faith is as groundless and unsupported by the record as is. the furth'er statement
of app1ellants in ~heir brief (page 30) that A. H.
Ball'' at every stage rendered such help, a.s he could
1
to the defendant.'' There is not anything to justify
.that.
As heretofore sho,vn, the defendant, because
of the business stated by him to be conducted on the
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leased pre1nises, required something more than a
mere month to month leas.e. ''7hen the lease was
prepared by Cluff, the terms and conditions of the
lease were discussed by J(no,vlton, counsel for defendant, 'Yith Cluff and Ball representing the
lessors, the defendant requesting a lease for five
years, Ball willing to giYe one only for three yearH.
Finally, they came to an agreement for a. lease for
three years 'vith ali option for five additional
years, provided the defendant on or before May 1,
1935, made permanent improvements on the le~sed
premises to the extent of $1,000.00. and- for sueh
additional period to pay a monthly rental of $90.00
instead of $75.00, and the lease so provided (Ab.
14). For such three years, the lessors. without complaint or objection received $75.00 a month, and for
the next three years $90.00 without any claim that
such rentals were not ~ntirely satisfactory. Talk
about bad faith on the part of the defendant, when
as the court found, and as presently will be shown
supported by the evidence. that the defendant under
the lease made valuable and permanent improvements of the premises not only to the extent of
$1,000.00, but in excess of $1, 700 . 00 ( Ab. 31).

ESTOPPEL
Counsel for appellants (page 23 of their brief)
further say that there was no evidence of an
estoppel. We first refer to the findings of the court
on the subject. Because the q~1estion of estopp·el
is one of the most important and controlling questions in the case, we take the liberty here to set
forth the court's finding in such resp·ect. The court
found (Ab. 31) :
"That the defendant in virtue of the written lease attached to ' its answer and under
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which it was put in possession of and
occupied the premises, on or before May
1, 1935 and in accordance with the terms
and p~rovisions of the said lease, made perman·ent improvements. in said storeroom
and basement so let and occupied by it, to
the reasonable value in excess of the sum
of $1,000.00, towit, more than $1,700.00, by
putting in a maple hardwood floor, building new stairways, p·utting in toilets and
partitions, installing electric wiring~ building and putting in new doors, putting in a
valuable p~late glass window in front of the
building, doing plumbing work and making
sewer connections, putting in tiling and
panel work, constructing a cement stairway, putting up valuable and p~ermanent
awnings, doing inside and outside painting
in p·res,ervation of the premises, laying and
gluing to the floor valuable and durable
linoleum, and making other valuable improvements and as in the additional answer
of the defendant alleged, all of ~hich ilnprovements were attached to the building
i ts.elf and were to be and to become part
thereof, and were so intended to be made,
none of which may be removed without injury to the premises to which they are
attached or without injury to the ·fixtures
or permanent improvements themselves;
and that such imp~rovements were made in
consideration that the defendant, as stipulated and provided in the said lease executed and delivered to it, was to be and
was given an additional extension of time
for a period of five years from September 25, 1936, or to and including Sep~tem
her 25, 1941, and of the payment of $90.00
a month rental instead of $75.00 for such
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additional five-years' period from September 25, 1936, and that the defendant as
rental on said premises paid to the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs and
until the commencement of this action the
sum of $90.00 a month instead of $75.00,
"rhich payments 'vere so received by the
predecessors in interest without any objection and "d.thout any claim made by them,
or any of them, that the possession or
oecupation of the defendant was without
right or a mere tenancy from month to
1nonth.''
Counsel by their brief do not refer to this finding. . They say nothing about it. Nowhere is it
~tated in their brief wherein the finding is not
supported by the evidence. They say it was alleged
~.bat the defendant in reliance upon its lease spent
$1,000.00 in permanent improvements, and that such
allegation was denied. True. But what they now
say is that Ball concealed from the owners the fact
of the defendant's lease. There is no evidence to
show that, and none pointed to. They say the reports of monthly collections of rent merely reported
the monthly payments of 79 West Second South.
Even that is not correctly stated. The monthly
rental statements show rents received from numerous parts of the building ~vithout showing the names
any of the tenants. The fact that the name -of
1he defendant was not mentioned is thus of no consequence. They then say Ball had not informed
Smith of the lease given the defendant. But without disp·ute it was shown that Smith directed Ball
to handle the property just as his father had. His
father gave written leases. No dispute as to that.
'fhev further say Dressler testified that when he
was· at Salt Lake City in November, 1937, and with

, ( 1/
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Ball went to the Eagle Block, Ball did not tell him
anything as to the tenants or about the lease given
the defendant. But Ball tes,tified he then told
J)ressler about the. lease. However, we have already referred to the testimony of Pressler that
he made no inquiry concerning the tenants, or what
leas.e they had, not anything as to the management
or handling of the property, made no inquiry, founa
nothing, knew nothing.
Smith, who· visited the premises several times
while A. H. Ball had charge of them, testified that
Ball told him he now had a good man in the p~rem
ises, where theretofore they had a poor tenant, yet
did not tell him under vvhat lease he was in possession. It is not made to appear that Smith asked
him. The burden of the appellants' brief on this
subject chiefly consists of characterizing Ball of
''treachery to his p~rincipals in making the Floor
lease and not reporting it," and that his failure
to do so was ''a deliberate betrayal of the interest
of his principals.'' We think this uncalled for. For
years Gunter for the owners and lessors. prepared
leases to be signed for and on their behalf by H. T.
BrJl and A. Il. Ban. It is not made to appear that
the leases or copies of them were sent or were required to be sent to the lessors. No complaint was
made of that until after the Eagle building was conveyed to the plaintiffs,. who now complain, not,vithstanding before they. purchased the premise-sr, they
had actual knowledg~ of ilie defendant's possession, of his lease and of the terms and .conditions
thereof, and tha.t a copy of the lease was submitted
to their attorneys before they purchased the premi~es. They thought they could "break it'' (Ah.
108). ·Why chas.tise Ball and denounce him ·a traitor
because he had not informed the lessors of the
terms of the defendant 'R lease, "\\rhen the plaintiff~
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then1selv-es, before they purchased the premises,
full ,,~ell knew of the terms and conditions of the
lease, the possession of the defendant under it and
the making of valuable and permanent imp.rovements by him'? And too, neither of them took the
witness stand to deny a word of it (Ab. 35).
Space does not admit of detailed references to
the numerous exhibits of monthly reports and
statements transmitted by Ball to the lessors, nor
to the correspondence had between them concerning the handling and managing of the prop·erty by
Ball, all of which was approved by the lessors. However, as to \\"'hat the p-redecessors of the plaintiffs
knew as to the defendant's lease, the court made
specific findings (~I\_ b. 29, 30, 31). Space does not
admit here setting up such findings in haec verba.
The court found that while there was no- positive or
direct evidence that the predecessors of the p~lain
fitfs saw the written leases executed by H. T. Ball
or by A. H. Ball, nor the lease or a copy thereof
of the defendant prepare-d by Cluff and signed by
Ball for and on behalf of the lessors, yet the court
found facts and circumstances from which the only
reasonable inference deducible was that both H. T.
Ball and A. H. Ball had right and authority to execute the leases for and on behalf of the predeces~
sors of the plaintiffs and that they "\Vell kne)V that
the possession of the defendant was something
more than a mere lease from month to month, that
rentals of the premises in question were collected
by Ball from the same tenant and reported to the
le~sors for the first three years at $75.00 a month,
and thereafter for nearly three years and until thP
premises ,vere conveyed to the- plaintiffs, a.t the rate
of $90.00 a month. VVe submit the record well
supports such findings. As to most of the facts so
found, there does not see1n much, if any, dispute.
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The reasonable inferences deducible therefro1n were
peculiarly within the province of the trial court.
lTnder recognized established rules of evidence,
findings of ultimate facts may well he based and
determined upon indirect evidence and upon reasonable inferences deduced from other p~roven facts
and circumstances. Many criminal offenders have
properly been found guilty of the commission of
offenses upon such character of evidence though
there was no pos.itive or direct evidence of guilt.
No particular form or language is necessary to constitute authority in writing. It may be gathered
from letters and telegrams, etc.
Fritsch v. Hess, 49 Utah 75; 162 P. 70,
and may he inferred or deduced from surrounding
facts and circumstances.
The finding "\Vhich the court made a.s to valuable
and piermanent imp~rovements and the character
thereof made on the premises by the defendant under
and in pursuance of his lease has already heen referred to. (Ab. 31). Floor testified with respect
thereto in detail just what improvements, were
1nade, by whom, and what they cost, and numerous
bills, statements and checks concerning them were
put in evidence. Ifis direct examination is found on
page 88 to 101, and his cross examination 102 to
108 of the abstract. His tes,timony more fully
appears in the transcript "\vhere references are made
to exhibits put in evidence by hjm with respect to
the imp~rovements made, consisting of defendant's
exhibits 31 to 40 inclusive. Some bf these exhibits
show not only permanent improvements made, but
also the movable fixtures not claimed as permanent
improvements. These the witness distinguished.
J\s to the permanent improvements, (Tr. 2t2, et
seq.) Floor testified that he expended for tiling
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around the front of the building $183.25; (Tr. 275
io 285), that he expended for a new maple floor,
partitions, laYatories in the basement, sewer connections and plumbing. , paneling, painting, stairways and cement steps $775.00; additional paneling $25.00;· changing doors in rear room and new
doors, $20.00; (Tr. 291, et seq.), transome and
screens, $~2.50; partition, s'vinging doors, large,·
new glass in front of the building, and doors in the
basement, $152.35; (Tr. 296), expended for necessary modern electrical wiring and making connections, $181.85; putting up awnings, $56.25; ( Tr.
299), painting the outside three coats, $61.00; for
other floors, papering, hinges, linoleum glued to
the floor and different other items concerning perJnanent improvements, ·$97.2{); (Tr. 304., et seq.),
that he spent about $55.60 for screen doors and
lumber, paperhanging and for other minor permanent improvements, amounting in all to the sum
of $1,746.26. All these imp·rovements, and as found
by the trial court, were attached to the building itself and were to be and to become a part thereof
and so intended to be when made~ and none of which
may he removed without injury to the premises to
which they are attached or 'vithout injury· to the
permanent fixtures themselves.
In addition to such improvements, Floor testified he also expended about $237.50 for booths in
the front p~art of the building, .about $7/5.00 for
cigarette cases and arches, about $72.00 for tables,
$430.00 for booths in the back p·art of the buildings.,
installed a bar and mirror, and made numerou~
other improvements, in all, amounting to sorrjething
like $3,000.00 or $4,000.00, non~ of which considered
or claimed to be p·ermanent improvements; and that
the permanent improvements consisted of those
found and enumera.ted by the court, Abstract 31, and
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upon which were expeD:ded, as. the court found, more
than $1, 700.00, and as testified to by the witness consisted of about $1, 750.00.
It will be noticed by the cross examination of
witness Floor that many questions were- asked him
eoncerning moneys expended for equipments in the
building, put there by the defendant which in no
.sense were claimed by him as permanent imp·rove~
ments, but the witness. otherwis.e in his testimony
.~learly indicated those which were regarded as permanent imp~rovements and as found by the court,
and those which "\vere regared as mere movable trade
fixtures.
But say appellants in their brief, the improvements made. were not permanent, were not fixtures
·so a.ttached to the building as to become a part
thereof, and further say that the defendant had
not expended $1,000.00 in making them, or that they
were not in value $1,000.00. The record shows that
neither the value nor the character of the improve..
ments as testified to by Floor was dis})uted. No
witness on the subject was called by the plaintiffs.
As found by the court and as testified to by Floor,
authorities need not be cited to justify the conclusion that such improvements so attached to the
realty became a part thereof, at least by far thet
greater part thereof as enumerated by the findings,
and that they were in value at least the sum of
$1,000.00. But see
'26 C. J. 657, ·Sec. 4, Subdivs. III-IV; 658,
666, Annotation 39; A.L.R. 1044.
Appellants .cite Brice v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86; 86 Pac.
765 as supporting their view that the claimed permanent fixtures were mere trade fixtures. All
that is required to see that the case has no application is to note the difference between the nature
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and character of the improvements there and here
inYolved. So, too, as to the citation of other cases
on the subject by the appellants. That the in1provements 'Yere in fact made as, found by the
court and as testified to by Floor is not disputed.
'That they 'Yere made for and in consideration of an
option of an additional five years' extension of the
defendant's lease and the payment of $90.00 instead of $75.00 during such extended p·eriod also,
is also not disputed. Who but moron would enter
into a lease to make p~rmanent imp·rovements of
the value of $1,000.00 on a mere month to month
1ease J? \\no but a moron on a mere month to month
lease would even make and put into the building
mere trade fixtures to the value of from $4,000.00
cr more, not knowing hoV\r soon he might be noticed
to vacate the premises'

a

Counsel further say that no notice was given
the le~sors themselves as to the exercise of the
option as provided by the lease. As to tha.t" the
record discloses without dispute that A. H. Ball,
who had charge and management of the property
and was authorized to make leases and to collect
rentals, had notice and knowledge of the exercise of
the option by the defendant and of the making of
permanent improvements under and in pursuance
of the lease by the defendant· on or before May 1,
1935, and approved the same. The record also
~hows that :rvfiss Noble, the p·resident of the Noble
Company, also visited the premises and was told
and shown of the improvements being made by the
defendant and express·ed approval thereof. The
record also shows without dispute that the lessors
for the first three years of the tenancy of the defendant received rentals at the rate of $715.00 a
'
~
1nonth, and thereafter for nearly three years, received rentals at the rate of $90.00 a month. We
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submit that notice to an agent such as Ball, having
the exclusive management and control of the prem_
is.es and in handling the property for and on behalf
of the lessors, was sufficient notice to the lessors.
of the exercise of the option. Nor does. it lie in the
mouth of the lessors after accepting and claiming,
as they do, the benefits of the m~de P'ermanent improvements, to now declare that they were not personally notified of the exercise of the option.
In view of the findings. of the trial court and
of the authority conferred upon Ball with the exclusive mana.gement and handling of the prope.rty,
as hereinbefore indicated, the rule indicated by
ap·pellan ts in their brief and cases .cited to the
effect that knowledge of the ag,ent may not be imputed to the princip,al when the third party, here
the defendant, knew that the agent had no authority
to make the contract, has here no application, for
that there is no evidence that the defendant was
possessed of any such knowledge, ana lurther because of the findings of the trial court supported by
ample evidence that Ball was clothed with author..
ity to give leases, as his father had done, and that
for many years written leases were -given both by
H. T. B:all and A. H. Ball, and from other .p.roven
facts and circumstan(jes · the only reasonable· de ...
ducible inference is and as found by· the court, that
the lessors and predecessors of the plaintiffs had
knowledge thereof.· In view of all the facts and
circumstances in evidenee and of the general a.gency
conferred upon both H. T. and A. H. Ball, it is almost incredible to believe otherwise, or that the predecessors of the plaintiffs for twenty years were
ignorant thereof, or p·aid so little attention to the
management and handling of the property as not
to know thereof, and that it was wen within the
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proYince of the trial court to deduce the inference
and deductions as found by the court.
Further as to the question of fixtures. If the
posses,sion of the defendant should now be terminated or t.ernrinated at the end of the additional
five years, no one would he b<>ld enough to assert
that the defendant, "Tithout the consent of the plaintiffs, could ren1ove any of the improvements found
by the trial court and attached to the realty as
permanent improvements, and that if in such -case
the defendant undertook to do so, s.wift indeed
''Toulcl tl1e plaintiffs be seeking .injunc)t\ive relief
to prevent such removaL

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
"\\__,.e come now more particularly to the statute
of frauds, 33-5-1, R. S. 1933, relied on by the appellants. In fact, their contention chiefly is based
upon the ~ta.tute that an estate or interest in real
property of any one, other than leases for a term
not exceeding one year, can be created only . . . ''by
his la\\rful agent thereunto authorized by writing.''
In considering the statute, let the Court also keep·
in mind 33-5-8 wherein it is p.rovided that "nothing
in this chapter contained shall be construed to
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific
performance of ag'reements in cas.e of part p.erformanee thereof.'' Let it also be noted that at common
la'v and under the practice of ancient courts in
E-quity, law and equity could not be administered
in the same forum and in the same action. and that
both legal :and equitable defens.es could not be internosed
in an action at law. But under the code,
.
104-9-5, R. S. 1933,
both legal and equitable defenses may be interposed
to a complaint, whether at law or in equity. Here,
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an equitable estoppel was interposed. No contention
is or could be made ag1ainst that. It is predicated
upon part performance, receip,t of benefits, upon
acts and conduct constituting an estoppel, and on
1
the doctrine that to permit the interposition of the
statute of frauds by the plaintiffs, in effect,
amounted to a fraud upon the defendant. Let it
be assumed that .A.• H. Ball had no express authority in writing to execute and deliver the lease in
question to the defendant. Yet, in view of the findings of the trial court and upon the record, the exclusive management and control of the p·remis.es by
A. H. Ball, and prior thereto by his father, and
court, written lea.ses were
where, as found by
made by both H. T. and A. H. Ball, under circum~stances where it may reasonably be inferred that
the predecessors of the plaintiffs had knowledge
thereof, and without objections from tinie to time
received rentals and benefits of leases made and executed by H. T. and A. H. Ball and received rentals
and benefits for six years from the defendant, and
the making of valuable and permanent improvements as heretofore indicated, clearly constituting
part p·erformance upon his part, how stands the
case~ This, therefore, is not a case merely where
it is sought to hold the principal on an unauthorized conveyance of his lands or his interest therein,
stripp·ed from all acts and conduct, benefits. received, part p~erformance and elements of an estoppel, things not involved in many of the cases cited
by counsel for the appellants..

the

As we understand, counsel for appellants do
not dispute the rule or doctrine that benefitR rec~ived ard kept, or that p·art performance or acquiescence in an unauthorized contract or lease, or
tha.t acts and conduct amounting to an estoppel do
take the cas.e out of the operation of the statute
oi frauds. But whether counsel for the app·ellants
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do or do not dispute the proposition, such, we under ..
:stand, is the "'ell established rule, whether the contract t~ l'Pga:~:ded us ,-oid or only voidable, if the
contract itself is not illegal or against morals1 or
-public policy, or ultra vires, or one 'vhich the p~re
decessors of the appellants could not themselves
haYe lawfully made. In
25 R. C. L. at page 261, and under Sec. 62,
the author discusses the que8tion that in England
a deliYery of possession pursuant to an agreement
is in itself such part performance as to take the
case out of the operation of the statute of frauds,
citing eases, but that the American decisions are
not in harmony on such question, that many of the
. .-\merican courts follow the English rule, some do
not, some requiring something in addition to mere
taking possession. Then on page 264, Sec. 65, th~
author further says that though, a.s has been seen,
the courts are not in harmony as. to the sufficiency
of possession alone to constitute part performance,
but that there seems to be practically no diversity
of opinion where possession is ta.ken under the contract in pursuance thereof and continued, and
accomp·anied by lasting and valuable improvements
of the premises, that the case is taken out of the
operation of the statute of frauds, that the entry
into possession and the making of the improvements
are held to amount to such an alteration in the purrhaser 's position (here the lessee) as. will warrant
the courts entering a decree of specific performance,
in support of \Yhich the author under Notes 14 and
15, and especially under 15, cites many cases from
n1any different jurisdictions. In
27 C..J., page 343, Sec. 427,
under the subject, ''Statute of Frauds,'' the author
says that where one party to an oral contraet has
b1 reliance thereon, so far performed his part of
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the agreement that it would be perp·etuating a fraud
upon him to allow the other party to repudiate the
contract and to set up the statute of frauds, in justification thereof, equity will regard the case as
being remov~d from the operation of the statute
.and vvill enforce the contract. In support of that
very many cases are cited from many different
jurisdictions. In
21 C. J., page 1206, under the title, "Estoppel, '' Sec. 207,
the author says that where one having the right to
accept or reject a transaction, takes and retains
benefits thereunder, he ratifies the transaction, is
bound by it and cannot avoid its oblig~ation or effect
by taking a p.osition inconsistent therewith, in support of which very many cases, are cited from many
~different jurisdictions.
And in Sec. 209, that a
party to a transaction cannot ordinarily affirm it
in part and in part disaffirm it, and that with regard to rights claimed under a contract, etc., a party
will not be allowed to assume the inconsistent position of affirming the contract in p.art and disaffirming it in part, etc. And in Sec. 211, it is said that
it has frequently been held that a p~erson by the
-acceptance of benefits may be es.topped from questioning the existence, validity .and effect of a contract, and that such app.lies to a contention made
that the contract was void and in violation of the
~statute of frauds, in support of which again very
rnany cas.es are cited from many different jurisdictions. In
5 Pomeroy Equity Juris. (2d Ed.) page
5011, Sec. 2243,
the author also states that while the authority of
the English and many American cases undoubtedly
Rupport the view that possession alone is sufficient
to take a case out of the- operation of the statute of
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frauds;, but that there is a diversity of opinions by
the . .\merican cases as to that, but, says the author,
that the rule is nearly universal holding that possession coupled with the making of valuable improv-ements is sufficient part performance to take
the case 'Yithout the operation of the statute of
frauds, and at Note 26 cites very many cases from
many different jurisdictions. In
on Agency (2d Ed.) at p~age 316,
Sec. 435,
the author s~ys that one who voluntarily accepts
the \vhole or any part of the proceeds of an act done
by one assuming, though without authority, to he
his agent, n1ust ordinarily be deemed to ratify the
act and take it as his own with all its burdens, as
\vell as of its benefits, that he may not ordinarily
take the benefits and reject the burdens, but must
~ither accept thP,m or reject them as a whole. Again
the author .cites very many cases from ma~y. jurisdictions, including
1

~Iecham

Gutheil v. Gilmer, 27 Utah 496.
Then at Sec. 436, the author further says that when
the principal discovers that there has come into his
hands the proceeds of an unauthorized act done by
one who assumed therein to act as his agent, to
voluntarily retain s.uch proceeds is, ordinarily to
-ratify the act, citing cases. In
Hargreaves v.. Burton, 59 Utah 575; 206
Pac. 262,
hy the syllabus it is stated with respect to the statute of frauds, that where a defendant in an action
to quiet title relied on an oral contract for the purchase of the property, he must prove a certain, definite and unambiguous contract and also such acts
in part performance thereof as in equity are considered sufficient to take the case out of the stat-
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ute. Here, the lease pleaded and relied upon is! in
writing, though let it be ass:umed unauthorized, yet
it is certain, definite and unambiguous. There id
no doubt as to that, and so, too, do we contend that
the nature and cha.racter of the imp-rovements made
in pursuance of the contract and in excess of
$1,000.00 were of such character and natute a.s to
be valuable and permanent improvements. ·In
Hogan v. Swayze, 65 Utah 380; 237 P·ac.
1097,
the doctrine as heretofore stated, is well recognized
by the Supreme Court of this State and wherein,
among other things, it is stated hat specific performance will be decreed even in favor of a donee
of parol gift Qf land where gift is followed by possess-ion and substantial improvements in reliance
thereon. The doctrine that possession and part p.erformance in pursuance of an oral or unauthorized
·contract is also r~cognized in
Lynch v. Coviglio. 17 Utah 106; 53 Pac.
983,
as taking the case out of the op,eration of the statute of frauds.
Valuable annotations are appended in
33 A.L.R. page 1489,
to the cas.e of Hargreaves v. Burton. sup~ra, supporting the same doctrine. There the annotator
:says that though the courts in a few :Jurisdictions
tlo not recognize the doctrine, it is the generally
accepted view that part p.erformance of a parol contra.et or the sale, gift or leasing of land, has under
certain circumstances the effect of taking the contract out of the operation of the statute of frauds
so that chancery may decree its sppcjfie performance if the remedy at law would be inadequate and
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the contract is one "\vhich, if in writing, would be
enforceable in equity; that the principle on which
.rests this exception to the statute of frauds which
1nakes a 'vritten contract essential to a valid agreement to convey land is that a court of equity will
not permit the use of the statute to perpretr~te a
practical fraud. The annotator then cites and re-Vie\YS cases in jurisdictions where imp-rovements
were not essential to part performance, citing cases.
Then the annotator refers. to what contracts the
doctrine was applicable and s,tates that the rule
,\~as '\Veil settled both in England and in America
that if the vendee under a verbal agreement for
the purchase of real estate expends labor or money
in imp-roving the same, the contract is thereby'partially performed and the statute of frauds has no
application to it, citing many cases from nearly
every State in the Union, including Utah. The
author there also cites .cases as to the character of
the improvements, that the improvements must be
permanent and valuable, and then refers to particular improvements, to which we particularly call
attention; among others, to the case of
Friberg v. Bjelland, 95 Ore. 3.20; 182 Pac.
1113,
where the author says that in that case it appeared
that the lessee had the interior of.the house painted
and tinted, had some cloHets made 'in the house and
put in some additional electric lights and wiring,
spending about ·$150.00 on the house before he
rnoved in and paig his monthly rental of $20.00, and
that the Court there said:
''An action at law would not afford the
plaintiff adequate relief. It would be inequitable to permit the pla.intiff to be
ejected from the dwelling before the ex-
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piration of the time orally agreed upon for
the lease. There was a definite agreement
between the parties, for a lease for the
term of six years at .a rental of $20.00 per
month. By the terms of the Ieas.e, the
lessee wa.s" to make "whatever repairs or
alterations· he_ might desire, in order to fit
the dwelling for the use during that period.
Relying upon the contract, and in compliance therewith, plaintiff took possession
of the premises,. and within a short time
expended the sum of $330.00 in repairs and·
alterations of the house and the construction of a g,arage on the lot. Such outlay
Btrongly indicates that Friberg had an
understanding or contract with Mr. Bjelland for a lease of the p-remises for a p.eriod of more than one year, or he would not
have expended a sum of money greatly in
excess of· one year's rental. The refusal by
the defendant to perform the agreement
operates as fraud' upon the rights of plaintiff.''
The annotator also refers to other cases from Wisccnsin, ·Washington, Missouri and Illinois to the
same effect.
Extended notes· are also found app.ended to thP
case of
Hallig·an v. Frey, reported in 49 L.R.A..
(N. S.) 113,
and· where the annotator s.ays that the great weight
of authority was to- the effect that equity would iniervene to protect the rights of one who has taken
an oral lease. out of the statute of frauds by part
performance, citing many, many cases. See also
notes in

3 L.R'.A. (N. S.) 790.
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In 31 L.R.A. (N. S.), page 738,
the author under the subhead of ''Ratification or
Estoppel'' says, that even though the selling and
leasing of property belonging to a banking association be not considered as within the ordinary
powers and duties of a bank cashier, such a sale or
lease may be ratified by the acts and conduct of the
board o~ directors, or the bank may become estopped
from questioning the authority of its cashier, so
as to render a contract entered into by him the
contract of the bank.
To some extent the case of
Jacksonville M. P. Ry~ & Navig~ation Co. v.
Hooper, 160 U.S. 512; 40 L. Ed. 515,
rs here applicable, wherein by the syllabus it is
stated that a company is bound by a lease signed
for it by its president, although there was no proof
that he was authorized to do so by a resolution of
the board, where the company took possession of
the premises, rented a portion thereof.- and received
and receipted for the rent.
In the case of
Tobias v. Towle, (Wash.) 35 Pac. (2d)
1114,
the syllabus says that where agent leased premises
ior Lranch office in name of his principal, carried
on business in his name and had ap.parent general
authority, the principal held estopped to . deny
liability for delinquent rent on ground that agent
had no actual authority to sign lease, and that a
principal 'vho intrusted agent with app·arent general authority to sign lease could not accept benefits of agent's contract without incurring its
obligations. In
Simpson v. Nelson, (Colo.) ; 208 Pac. 455,
it wa.s held tha.t a landowner's acceptance of money
paid a.s interest under a lease and option to buy
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executed by her deceased· husband without her
written authority constituted ratification of the
contract of sale sufficient to justify determinations
for lessee in suits involving his· right to enforce
op.tion. In
Carnahan v. M. J. & B. M. Buck Co.,
(~1ich.); 229 N. W. 513.,
it was held that where- a lease is one that the corporation might make, the corporation could ratify
the lease, and where the corporation ratified the
lease by acquies.cence, the corporation was estop·ped
to s.ay that it was· not bound under the lease; that
directors of corporation will be charged with
knowledge of- which it was their duty to know; that
directors. of corporation. occupying premises and
pay;ing. rent. must be held to know of lease and its
te.rms and of occupancy and. p~aying rent.
In the case of·
Fine Arts Corp. v. Kuchins Furniture Mfg.
Co., (Mich.) ; 257 N. W. 823,
it was held that though a lease was void under the
statute of frauds becaus.e not authorized by an
ag~nt in writing, yet held the lease ratified by the
lessor's letters acknowledging agent's authority
B.nd demanding payment of rent. On the question
of ratification of a contract made by an agent unauthorized to make it, see also
Stuart

v~

Mattern, (Mich.); 105 N. W. 35.

If it is desired to further pursue the subject,
we cite
Fudicker v. Glenn, 237 Fed. 808.
Peterborough R. Co. v. Nashua & L. R. Co.,
59 N.H. 835.
.
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Alexander v. Culbertson Ir. & Water Power
Co., 61 Nebr. 333; 85 N. W. 283.
\"Vest v. \Y ashing1on & C. River R. Co., 49
Ore. 436; 90 Pac. 666.
King v. "';:est Coast Grocery Co., 72 Wash.
132; 129 Pac. 1081.
Manchester Marble Co. v. Rutland R. R.
Co., (Vt:); 136 Atl. 394..
Hagar v. Home Stores, Inc., (Cal.); 2.59
Pac. 1007.
Zenos v. Britten Cook Lan_d & L. S. Co.,
(Cal.); 242 Pac. 914.
Portland Cattle Ln. Co. v. Hansen L. S . Co.,
(Ida.); 251 Pac. 1051.
Cache Valley.Banking Co. v. Logan B. P.
0. E., (Utah) ; 56 Pac. (2d) 1046.
As heretofore stated, the defendant's lease was
not merely executory. For six years p.rior to the
purchase by the plaintiffs it was executed and performed by the defendant in g~ood faith, well believing that the lease gave the defendant the rigb.t to
occupy and possess the premises under the terms
and conditions specified in the leas,c. If anything
is established by this law suit, that is; notwiths,tanding the asserted conclusions of counsel for the
Hppelants to the contrary, or their ass.ertions that
the. improvements made were on.!y for the defendant's enjoyment of the p.remises. as. and for a month
to month leaS"e, or were: mere removable trade fixtures.. Should there be any doubt that the nature
and character of the improvements as found by the
court and enumerated by its findings and as. testified to by Floor were permanent improvements and
henefic1al to the freehold, wef in addition to the
text and cases heretofore cited" also cite
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Parker v. }Vulstein, (N. J. Eq.); 21 Atl.
623.
0 'Neill v. Lyric Amusement Co., 119 Ark.
454; 178 s. w. 406.
Jones v. Harsha, 225 Mich. 416; 19.6 N. W.
624.
Modern Music ·Shop v. Concordia Fire Ins.
Co., 226 N.Y. S. 630.
Black Hdwe. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 39 Fed. (2d) 460.
We thus say that both the predecessors of the
plaintiffs and the plaintiffs themselves are estopped
from asserting that the defendant's lease is void
under the statute of frauds., and that to p·ennit
the plaintiffs to interpose the· statute is tantamount
to permitting them to perpetrate a fraud upon the
defen~ant. However~ if for any reason it can he
considered that the predecessors of the plaintiffs
were not estopped because of want of knowledge
of the defendant's lease until after the premises
'vere conveyed to the plaintiffs., then we say that
the plaintiffs nevertheless are themselves estopp~ed,
because it was indisputably shown by the record
and as found by the court, that prior to the purchase of the premises, they had visited the premises, talked with Floor, the mana.g,er of the defendant, concerning the defendant's possession and of
its lea.se and of its. claimed right to continue in
possession until 1941, and 'vere informed of the
terms and conditions of the lease and a copy thereof submitted to plaintiffs' attorney, all before they
purchased the p·remises, and so the court found and
stated its conclusions of law. (Ab. 38).
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ATTORNEY'S FEES
As already indicated, the court, by its findings,
.conclusions and judgment, held the defendant's
lease valid, and that the plaintiffs were estopped
from asserting its invalidity. ~rhe lease, among
other things, provided that ''either party agrees
to pay all costs and attorney's fees and expenses
incurred by the other tha.t shall arise from enforcing tll e cove.nants of this lease,'' and by reason
the_reof, the defendent alleged that if the plaintiffs'
complaint be dismissed, the defendant be allowed
$500.00 att0rney's fees, which the court found was
tStipulated by the parties in open court to be a rea~
sonable attorney's fee for the purp·ose (F inding
9; A b. 36), and evidence also was given to show that
$500.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee (Ab. 98).
Thus the court, by its judgment, allowed the defendant $500.00 as an attorney's fee by reason of
such provision in the lease and stipulation of
counseL
1

The appellants now say there was no p·rivity
between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and
that the proVIsion for attorney's fees was
not a covenant running with the land. Here
the appellants again assert that the lease was
not executed by Ball on behalf of the true
owners and lessors, that is, that it was executed on
behalf of the Stockyards National Bank, the Noble
Company and the Fred Bragg Estate, when as they
say, only the Noble Company -constituted a real
O\vner and lessor. ·We heretofore have gone over
that, and have shown that the interest of the Stockyards National Bank, prior to S.ep·tember, 1933, and
at all times subsequent thereto and until the conveyance of the prop-erty to the plaintiffs, was still
earried on in the name of the Stockyards National
Bank and that the parties so treated the bank as
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still the owner of a one-fourth interest in the Eagle
Block; that the one-fourth interes,t of the Fred
]3ragg Estate and of all of the heirs interested in
that estate p·rior to 1933 and at all times subsequent
thereto, was treated by the parties and carried on
in the name of the Fred Bragg Estate including
the heirs, and that all the dealings with respect
thereto were had with attorney Brome, representing the esta.te and all the heirs thereof. We have
also shown tha.t Dressler and Hovey, to whom it
was said the Stockyards National B·ank conveyed
its one-fourth interest, were mere trustees, and only
as such conveyed the same to the plaintiffs, and
that they at no time otherwise had any right, title
or interest in or to the property. Since the· parties
thus through all theii:· negotiations prior to 1933 and
at all time p,rior to the conveyance to the plaintiffs,, treated and regarded the Noble Company as
owning one-half of the conveyed pTemises to the
plaintiffs, the Stockyards National Bank a.s onefourth and the Fred Bragg Estate one-fourth. the
lease signed and executed by A. H. Ball as. the
agent for and on behalf of the lessors and p·redecessors of the plaintiffs, the court. was justified
in holding that the lease was made for and on behalf of the real owners and lessors of the premises.
·At no time during all of such period had the parties personally dealt 'vith the heirs of the Bragg
Estate, but for and on their behalf dealt with
Brome, repres.ertting the Fred Bragg Estate, and
including all persons interested in the estate. So,
too, so far as concerns the Stockyards N-ational
Bank, the p~arties during all of such period, de·alt
with and had all the transactions in the name of
the Stockyards National Bank and not in the name
of the trustees.
We think the finding and conclusion of the
court were well justified. That being so, much of
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the complaint made as to attorney's fees is groundless. The finding and conclusion being· justified,
there was privity between the plaintiffs and the
defendant. Strange it is, that while the plaintiffs
claim the benefits of the lease, so far as receiving
and accepting the increased rentals of $90.00 a
month for the additional period s.tipulated in the
lease and until the conveyance of the premises to
the plaintiffs, as well as claimin~ its benefits for
the purpose of showing the relation of tenancy bet,Yeen the defendant and the predecessors of the
plaintiffs, yet for all other purposes seek to reject
the lease. They say that there was no provision
in the grants that the plaintiffs took the property
subject to the lease. As heretofore shown, (See
defendant's Exhibit 41), the substance of the defendant's lease was put on record in the· office of
the County Recorder May 1, 1939, about a month
prior to the purchase of the premises by the plain~
tiffs; and as further heretofore shown, the plain..
tiffs had actual knowledge of the defendant's lease
and of the terms and conditions thereof and of its
possession thereunder, and of course, took the
premises, when they purcl1ased them, subject to the
lease. The app.ellants do not contend the contrary,
but what they, all through this law suit,. maintain~d
'vas that the lease was void because not exeicuted
by an agent having \\rritten authority so to do. That,
the court, by its findings, conclusions and judgment, found and a~judged against ~the plaintiffs.
Ap·pellants further say there is no contra.ct lJetween the plaintiffs and the defendant. They
allege in their complaint that on September 25, 1933,
the Noble Company, Hovey and Dressler as trustees, and the heirs of the Bragg Estate ''leased, demis,ed and let to th'e defendant the p·remises" in
question ''from month to month at a .monthly
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rental of $70.00, and that on or about the 1st day
of May, 1935, by mutual agreement, the rental was
fixed at $90.00 per month,'' and that by such owners
the premises were conveyed to the plaintiffs on the
3ls,t day of May, 1939. The plaintiffs thus allege
a contract between the parties. But as heretofore
shown, there wa.s no such contract: that the only
contract between the predecessors of the plaintiffs
,and the defendant was the lease executed and delivered to the defendant for a term of years and as
alleged in the defendant's answer, being defend..
·ant's Exhibit 28. And as heretof0re shown, it is
under that lease, and not otherwise, that any relation of tenancy is now claimed by the plaintiffs. as
having existed between the plaintiffs' predecessors
and the defendant and under which they justified
the right of plaintiffs' predecessors in receiving
the rental of $90.00 a month for the extension of
the additional period of five years of the terms
of the lease. So that when the plaintiffs purchased
the premises,, they took them subject to such lease.
Then the appellants say the provision in the
leaS'e providing for a.tt.orney's fees was not a covenant running with the land, that it was. a mere
personal covenant of the lessors and predecessors
of the plaintiffs, and hence not binding on the
plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, before they. purchased the
premises, having had both actual knowledge and
constructive notice of the terms and conditions of
the lease under which the defendant was in possession, and knowledge of the permanent improvements, made by the defendant under and in pursuance of the lease, did so subject to .the lease and
~ubject to all rights, privileges and equities. possessed by the defendant. In such case, tlie plaintiffs as grantees stood. in the shoes of the grantors
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and assignors of the lease, and 'vhat the latter
"-ere required or obligated to do, so likewise were
the plaintiffs. Such is the general rule and as
shown in
35 C. J., Sec. 544, page 1214.

As there stated, 'Yhere the lessee is in possession,
the purchaser takes subject to the lease, and where
the lessee is in possession under a defective or void
lr·.q.~e, the purchaser will take subject to any equities
of the lessee, that generally the rights and liabilities
existing between the grantee and the lessee a.re
the same as those existing between the ,grantor and
the lessee. Many cases are cited in support of the
text. On the following page it is also stated tha,t
if a lease is voidable, the grantee may, oy his; acts,
preclude himself from thereafter attaeking it, as
by the acceptance of rent; and if the lease is voidable at its inception and the lessee has. paid rents
and. made improvements, a subsequent purchas(?r
of the land with knowledge of the facts cannot -avoid
the lease'.
. \_s
.
shown by the record and on the facts as
found by the court, the plaintiffs- had no more right,
than had their grantors if no conveyance of tlie
r>remises had been made, to terminate the tenancy
of the defendant by the service of notice demandjng possession of the premises and upon a refusal
tG surrender possession, to bring an action therefor.
There can he no greater invasion of rights' with re~pect to leas.ed premises than by a wrongful service
of notice to vacate and the bringing of . an action
to eject the tenant from the premis.es. To defend
his occupation and enjoyment, one in possession
of necessity is required to employ counsel andls
put to costs and expenses 1n defending and main-
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ta.ining his rights under specified and agTeed covenants of his lease.
Here the covenant in the leas.e whereby either
party was to pay costs, attorney's fees and expens-es
incurred arising from enforcing the covenants of
the le~a.se, was mutual and reciprocal and was for
the benefit not only of the lessor, but also of the
lessee. That is, it "\vas not only a personal covenant, so far as the lessor was concerned, hut it was,
as well, a mutual and reciprocal covenant for the
benefit of the lessee.
The plaintiffs here having served a notice that
the defendant vacate the p·remis,es and upon its refusal to do so having brought this action, the defendant, by setting- up. its lease and the provisions
therein contained, pleaded and invoked an enforcement of the terms. of the lease, including the covenant relating to attorney's fees.
We note the eases cited by appellants upon this
subject. They cite Hollander v. Central J\tfetal, etc.
,Co., (Md.); 71 Atl. 442; 2'3 L.R.A. (N. S.). 1135.
It will he observed that the Court there was, considering the question of whether a covenant by the·
lessor to convey in fee to the lessee, its heirs, .and
assigns upon the p·erformanee of certain conditions.
runs with the land. The Court held it did. We
have no disagreement as lo what the Court there
said as to covenants running with the land. And
further, let it be noticed that the cited case went off
on a demurrer to the complaint.
They also cite Cohen v. Birns, 170 N.Y. S.
560. A reading of the case will show that it has
here no application. There, Cohen and liis cotenants deposited with ·Weiss, the lessor, $400.00
as security for tbe performance by the tenants of
the covenants of the lease, one of 'vhich was the
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pa:y1nent of the rent when due, the repair of the
premises and their surrender in as good condition
as reasonable 'Year and tear permitted, and that
-the deposit of $400.00 'vas to be returned to Cohen
and his co-tenants at the expiration of the lease if
the covenants were kept and performed. Space
does not permit here a reYiew of the case. A reading of it "ill shovr that it has no application, for,
it is not even clear whether the dep.osit of ·$400.00
''as a part of the lease or not, or something entirely
collateral to the lease. Here the covenant to pay
attorney's fees was not collateral. It wa.s a part of
the lease itself.
The case of ~lagoon v. Eastman, 84 Atl. 869,
also is cited. There the lease contained a provision
that the lessee, "\vhen he vacated the premises, was
required to leave as much ha.y on the farm a8 was
there when he took possession and where the defendant left the required amount of hay, but it was
not cut in proper season and by reason thereof~ was
of less value than it otherwise would have beenr and
by reason of which, it was ''claimed that the
plaintiff, as successor in interest to the lessor, was.
entitled to the required amount of hay p-roperly and
~easona.bly harvested according to the rules of good
husbandry.'' With resp·ect to that the Court said
that might he so, but that the question there was
'vhether he could recover damages in an action of
covenant brought in his own name and where from
further observations it was made to appear that
the court merely denied the action becaus-e of its
form, that is, that it "\Vas not "an action of covf nant, '' but one for damages.
The appellants also cite Brandley v. Lewis,
(Utah); 92 Pac. (2d) 338. We submit the case is inapplicable, for all that was there considered and
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decided was that the appeal was not taken within
time, and therefore it was dismissed.
Forrester v. Cook, (Utah), 292 Pac. 206, also
is cited. The contract there provided for an attorney's fees, but the court s.aid that "this is not an
a.ction to enforce the agreement,'' that the plaintjff proceeded upon the theory that the agreement
fixed the status of the parties with forfeiture, that
thereupon the defendants became t~nants at will,
and that "no attempt was made to enforce any of
the provisions of the contract,'' and hence the law,
·and not the contract, fixed the measure of the damages and that the law itself did not allow attorney's
fees in that sort o£ an action, and for that reason
attorney's fees were not allowed. The question
there was not one dealing with the question of
whether the covenant was one running with the land
or not.
Leone v. Zuniga, (Utah), 34 P·ac. (2d) 699, alRo
is cited. Neither does this cas,e involve any question as to whether a covenant was one running with
the land or not. We see no application of the citation of these ·utah cases.. Excerpts of other cases
ion the subject are also cited by the app~ellants. To
see their application they must be consjdered in
connection with the facts of such cases and the partieular questions before the Court for decision.
vVhen so considered we think them not analogous
to either the facts or the question here involved.
According to ·the authorities and cases, it is
sometimes rather difficult in ascertaining wheth~r
the particular covenant is one running with the land
~or not. Texts and authorities teach that whether
the covenant is one running "\vith the land or not
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is to be determined from the intention of the parties
and as gathered from the 'vhole instrument. In
the case of
Keogh v. Peck, 316 TIL 318; 147 N.E. 266;
38 A.L.R. 1151,
the Court said that the test as to whether the covenant runs with the land or is merely 'personal, is
"\\~hether the covenant concerns the thing granted
and the occupation or enjoyment of it, or is a mere
collateral and personal covenant not immediately
concerning the thing granted. In

7 R. C. L., page 1106, Sec. 22,
the author says that as a general rule covenants
in a lease relating to the thing demised run with the
land even though the covenant does not in certain
instances have reference to something to be done
upon the land itself; that in accordance with the
general rule real covenants running with the lana
in leases jnclude covenants to pay rent, taxes or
assessments, to insure, to make improvements or
to pay for improvements, to make rep,airs or to
share in such expense, to deliver up the demised
premises in good order and repair, to renew a lease,
restrict the lessee 7s right of alienation, and other
conditions there enumerated. See also the following sections or paragraphs ; and also
Notes, 41 A.L.R. 1370,
where annotations are enumerated as to what covenants are considered as running with the land.
The claus.e or covenant here in question was
not something wholly collateral and independent of
the lease itself. It was something which expressly
and directly rela.ted to the enjoyment and occupa-
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tion of the leas,ed premises and to the enforcement
of the mutual and reciprocal rights and ben·efi ts of the lessors and the lessee. In other wordB,
and as heretofore observed 7 the act of the plaintiffs,
.1.Jhe grantees, without right serving a notice upon
the defendant to surrender up the possession of the
premises and upon its refusal so to do. the bringing
of an action to dispossess the defendant and to eject
it from the p·remises was a direct invasion of the
defendant's rights to the use and enjoyment of the
p·roperty, and that the clause. or covenant in the
Jease had a direct hearing up.on such invasion and
as bearing on the enforcement of the covenants of
the lea.se on behalf of the les.see. W a thus. say that
such a covenant is one running with the land just
as much as a covenant to p·ay rent. But if it may
not be so considered, we further contend that under
the facts, as 'found and conclusions stated by the
court, and particularly because of the actual knowledge of the plaintiffs before they purchased the
prop~erty of the terms and conditions of the lease,
rincluding the clause or covenant in question, ana
of the valuable and p.ermanent improvements made
'hy the defendant, and of part p·erformance upon
its part, and of the facts as found by the court of
the estoppel of the p·laintiffs from questioning the
:validity or binding effect of the lease, and of the
plaintiffs' accep·tance of parts of the lease and
attemp1ting to reject other p.arts, the plaintiffs are
bound by the clause or covenant in question to the
same extent a.s though it wa.s a covenant running
with the land, and that the court may no more in
the one case than in the other treat and regard the
·covenant in question as co1lateral to or independent
of the lease, but is required to consideT the cov·
I

1
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enant as part and parcel thereof and as a binding
obligjation not only as to the lessors, but also upon
their g;rantees 'Yho purchased the premises w1th
full kno,vledge of all the rights, privileges and
equities of the defendant in possession.

We thus respectfully submit that the judgment
of the court be affirmed, with costs to the respondents.
WILLARD HANSON,
STEWART M. HANSON,
Attorneys for Defendant
and RespQndent.

D. N. STRAUP, of Counsel.
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